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of life" ethic and showing how that could yield practical conclusions
in the cases dealt with.
·
There have been many stories of this kind, but two in particular
have brought these issues into the public arena. The first is that of
"infant Doe." He was born wit h Down 's syndrome and an impaired
esophagus which prevent ed his being fed. The parents, acting on medical advice which seems to have been of debatable accuracy, decided to
deny medical treatment of the impairment with the result t hat he
could not take food. He was left, unfed and untreated , in a Bloomington, Ind., hospital for eight days until he died of " natural causes" on
April 16, 1982.1 The case went to the courts. In response to the
public outcry which this event occasioned, the R eagan administration
sent, at the President's request, a memorandum from t he Department
of Health and Human Services warning hosp itals t hat they would risk
losing federal funds if they withheld from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment required to correct
a threatening condition, solely because of the handicap. The Administration based its position on Section 504 of t he Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which prohibits any discriminat ion on the basis of handicap.
Warning notices had to be placed and " hot lines " were established for
the reporting of suspected cases. 2 However, t he regulations were challenged and a federal court declared t hem invalid. A final rule was
eventually adopted including a number of modifications. This rule
took effect in February, 1984. a
By this time, however, a second story had started to unfold. Baby
Jane Doe was born with spina bifida, an open spine condition; hydrocephalus, excess fluid on the brain ; and microcephaly, an abnormally
Stnall head. 4 The physicians informed her parents that, unless she had
surgery to correct the spina 'bifida and hydrocephaly, her life expectancy ranged from a few weeks to two years . With surgery, she might
SUrvi~e 20 years, but would be severely retarded, epileptic, paralyzed,
~dden, and subject to constant urinary tract and bladder infec/ons.5 Her parents decided to forego corrective surgery. This, they
elt? ~ould only prolong a life of suffering. They chose instead to use
antibiotics to protect against infection of the spinal column.
th Again the matter was taken to the courts . After a series of hearings,
e case came to a U.S. Court of Appeals. In February, 1984, the
court ruled : (1) that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not
~?Ply to treatment decisions involving seriously ill newborns, and (2)
~n May) that the regulations themselves were " invalid, unlawful and
\V Ust be ~e~ aside." As a result of this decision the federal government
si~prohtbtted from investigating or regulating su ch t reatment deciF' · The burden of settling the controversy passed to Congress. 6
on .~ally, after more than a year of stormy debate, Congress agreed
inf Baby Doe:• legislation designed to protect seriously handicapped
ants from the withholding of life saving treatment. The legislation
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was signed into law on October 9, 1984. This legislation requ iJ each
state to set up procedures in its child protective services sys :ms to
respond to and, if proper, to intervene legally in cases w r re the
withholding of medical treatment is disputed. The procedur< would
provide for consultation and notification to the state child pn ection
agency in cases of suspected medical neglect. States which de wt set
up the required procedures would risk losing agency funds.
Child abuse is redefined to include the ~'withholding of rr dically
indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threateni1 condi·
tions." This phrase is defined to mean the "failure to respo n to the
infant's life-threatening conditions by providing treatment (t< nclude
appropriate nutrition, hydration and medication) which, in ' e treat·
ing physician's reasonable medical judgment, will be most lik y to be
Some
effective in ameliorating or correcting all such conditiom
~
se
are:
exceptions are indicated where treatment is not required. 1
he
pro·
(1) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; (2 )
vision of treatment would (i) merely prolong dying, (ii) not •e effec·
tive in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-t h !atening
conditions, or (iii) would be otherwise futile in terms of the ~ vival of
the infant or ( 3) the provision of treatment would be virtuall futile in
terms of the survival of the infant, and the treatment itself L j er such
circumstances would be inhumane. 7
What Would Be Implications?
What would be the implications of this legislation for i fant Doe,
and Baby Jane Doe? In the case of Infant Doe, the refusa f correc·
tive surgery would seem to qualify clearly as "withholdi· ~ of med·
ically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life ..1reatening
conditions." Had this law been in existence in 1982 the B<-;o mington
Baby Doe could not have been starved to death bee~ tse it was
retarded.s The situation of Baby Jane Doe seems, at least a c f irst sight,
to be somewhat different. Infant Doe was deprived of t reatment
which would have been given to other "normal" infants w1t.h a similar
condition, allegedly because he was retarded. Was Baby Jane Doe
deprived of treatment because she was, or would be, retarded? Or was
the reason the whole range of disabilities from which she would suffer
even after treatment to correct the life-threatening conditions? would
treatment be required for other infants suffering from a sim ilar range
of disabilities, where the life-threatening conditions could be cor·
rected, but the other disabilities could not? No doubt there will be
further discussion aimed at clarifying the precise meaning of the laWB~t, as I :ead it, it requires that if the life-threatening condition of t~e
disabled mfant can be corrected or ameliorated it must be treate ·
The exceptions provided for do not seem to appl~ in the case of BabY
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Jane Doe. She was not, apparently, irreversibly comatose, even if she
would have been severely retarded. She was not "dying," so that the
treatment would not merely have prolonged dying. The treatment
would not have been virtually futile in terms of her survival. Therefore, it would seem that, in terms of the law, she should have been
treated.
The law does not provide the ethical rationale for its provisions and
probably it should not be expected to do so. However, the ethical
perspective on these matters is our major interest here. I will therefore
~ke up that perspective, and in particular explore how " quality of
life" ethics and "sanctity of life" ethics would seek to resolve the
dilemmas.
We can approach the issues on three levels. The first is purely
descriptive. Thus, we could begin by simply describing the functions
or capacities by which we identify "human life." These would be, for
ex~ple, vital and metabolic functioning, sentience, consciousness,
~es1re, relating to others. On a second level we could make value
t~dgments about such functions or qualities. These functions or quali_Ies are goods or values. On a third level we could make normative
. ~udgments about how we should respond to persons whose lives
.
mclude these functions or qualities.
T~e crucial differences between the different ethics appear in the
~ay 1 ~ which they make these value judgments and the way in which
bey Incorporate these value judgments into normative judgments
~ out_ the right way to respond to or treat persons. 9 For example, a
qu~hty of life" ethic would make a value judgment such as the fol1_owmg: a life which has the qualities of ·vital and metabolic function~~ plu~ sentience, consciousness, desire and the capacity to relate to
o er~, 1s of more value than a life which has only vital and metabolic
f
.
.
tunctions ·10 T o wh om are such hves
of more or less value? Different
yalpes of "quality of life" ethics would reply that what counts is the
V
·
fa ueil of sue h a l~fe ~o. society, to more particular
groups, such as the
Y, or _to the IndiVIdual herself or himself who is living that life.
eth~ movmg to the level of normative judgments "quality of life"
"n~~s would t~en form such judgments as: such a' low quality life is
worth savmg," or "not meaningful" or " not worth living." Thus
We
"
arguare not 0 bl 1ged
to sustain such lives, and, as some would go on to'
chare, t m~y . or even ought to, directly take such lives. That is, the
reJ·ecatc eristlc feature of a typical " quality of life" ethic is that it
s the
· ·
rejects th prm~lple of the equality of human lives and with that
. Th
e equality of human persons .II
dent ~~et~e, h~wever, two kinds of " quality of life" judgments eviinfant Doe _s tones I have re~oun~e~ ab?ve. Th~ ~irst take~ this form:
to meet thels retarded, th~t 1s, h1s hf_e 1~ of_~ef1c1ent quaht~ . He fails
to be
value-test which we reqmre md1v1duals to meet 1f they are
accepted into the community of equal persons. Therefore, we

7
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are not called on to provide him with the treatment we wou give to
"normal," equal persons. This is the clearest expression of a fusal to
treat, solely on the ground of handicap . Such a judgment is n nifestly
a form of discrimination. It violates the principle of equal '1 and is
against justice. 12 It may well be that the decision not to t at Baby
Jane Doe was based on a similar argument. But another inte retation
is possible and this brings us to another kind of "qualit of life"
judgment.
.
The second type takes the following shape: the kind of 'e which
Baby Jane would live even after the surgery would be d •cient in
certain qualities and would have many negative qualitie such as
retardation, epilepsy, paralysis, restriction of movement, col ant pain
or discomfort. Therefore, that kind of life would not be good or
value to her. It could, indeed, be considered a harm. 1 3 Wt. ught not
to harm other individuals, therefore we ought not sustain I 'J Y Jane's
life. In this kind of argument there is no direct discriminat n against
Baby Jane merely because her life is allegedly of less value com pari·
son to others. It is, of course, possible that this second ki 1. of argu·
ment could be put forward to disguise the "real" reas 1 for non·
treatment which might well be of the first kind . But t h two argu·
ments are genuinely distinct .
Argument Has Obvious Problem
There is one obvious problem with such an argu m 1t. As ~as
argued in the brief presented by the Spina Bifida Ass< iation m a
court case which concerned Baby Jane Doe, we cannot kr .w what the
outcome will actually be after treating such infants. 14 l • fact, m~Y
such infants have done much better than was expected . This ~e:~
the case, we should be extremely cautious in attempt i· .;;; ~uc~ J~
ments ahead of time. Indeed it could well be argued, t h .,t m vle t
.
the possibility of a reasonably satisfactory
outcome, we s11ou ld trea
all such infants.
. d ith
However, it may well be that tragic outcomes can be pt ed1cte wted
a high degree of probability. May such arguments as that presen .
above be used or is the approach inherently defective? Can such ar~
ments be faulted as ethical arguments? This question has been mu~r
debated. In particular, there has been ~onsiderable controver~~no:he
one particular form of the argument. Th1s has proposed t hat , w ron·
1
infant's condition is such that it has no potential for human re1~ ed
ships or if the potential would be utterly submerged and undeve opt1·-1
. then that hfe
. has ach1eve
. d 1·t s potenhave!II
in the' mere struggle to surv1ve,
and thus has no further claims on our life-sustaining care. 16 As 1f the
already noted this kind of argument does not seem t o be 0 JeSS
.
.
. d1v1
' 'duals as
discriminatory' kind wh1ch
evaluates some l'1vmg
m

than others, and so denies fundamental equality. In this account, such
infants have less or no further claims ori our care because a certain
kind of living is no longer a good or value for such infants. The issue is
the good of this individual , not a comparison by which this individual
is judged less good or valuable than other individuals. The basic problem seems to be in the way the value judgment is made about that
kind of living. Thus, a certain level of living is judged to be a good or
value for this individual only if it can (i.e., has the potential to)
provide for other "higher goods" such as human relationships. Some
critics would see here a subtle form of a "consequentialist" ethic. l B I
would suggest there is another difficulty. The capacity inherent in one
level of living to make possible "higher" levels of living is one aspect
of the goodness or value of that level of living. But it is not clear to
me, that when that capacity is lacking, this limited living ceases to be a
good altogether for the individual who lives that life. It is still the living
of a person, and that living person still has claims on our care. A better
approach would be not to attach degrees of good to the living of that
person, but to recognize that we have positive duties in response to
that living person and then to examine the scope and limits of those
.duties. This view of the matter is characteristic of the typical "sanctity
of life" ethic and I will now seek to outline the basic form of this
approach.
In the Roman Catholic tradition, there are two especially significant
statements of special relevance to the subject of this paper. The first is
from Pius XII:
· · · normally one is held to use only ordinary means - according to circum·
stances of persons, places times and culture- that is to say , means that do
not involve any grave burden for oneself or another. A more strict obligation
Would be too burdensome for most men and would render the attainment
of the higher, more important good too difficult . Life, health, all temporal
~ctivities are in fact subordinated to spiritual ends. On the other hand, one
18
not forbidden to take more than strictly necessary steps to preserve life
and health, as long as he does not fail in some more serious duty. 19

1
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!here are several noteworthy features of this statement. The question
15
~hether the means of treatment impose a grave burden on the
subject or another. The dominant perspective is that of the subjectrson who bears responsibilities in relation to the spiritual ends of
~rnan living. A requirement to bear what is, for this person, too great
a Urden in relation to her or his capacities, would place such weight
~~ herj~~ that it could exceed her/his moral strength, and thus make
d ~ attammg . of these spiritual ends excessively difficult. Thus, the
Y to sustam one's life is a positive, but a limited duty. Further, in
15
matter the limits are expressed by saying that one is obliged to use
on1y " d'
Usuan
or mary means" to preserve that life. Ordinary means were
all . Y. understood to be those which held out a prospect of benefit,
~Vlat10n or cure, and did not entail an undue burden in terms of
In a ·
' nxlety, expense, etc.

a

t;
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The second relevant statement is the Declaration on E t hanas~
issued by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the ~aith in
1980. This document explains the reasons why human life is ~ ~ood to
be fostered and protected.2° 1) Human life is the basis of a human
goods, and the necessary source and condition of every huma activity
and of all society. 2) Human life is sacred, and no one may t ;pose of
it at will. 3) Believers are in life something greater, namely 1 gift of
God's love, which they are called upon to preserve and mak fruitful.
The same document indicates, in a summary way, why the 1king of
the life of an innocent person is wrong: a) It opposes God love for
that person; b) It violates a fundamental right; c) It is a re. ction of
God's sovereignty.
e's own
The document then deals with the obligation to preserve
life. It notes that the traditional terms "ordinary" and " < traordin·
ary" may seem today to be less clear. The terms are imJ ecise and
modern medical science has made rapid progress in devel Jing new
treatments. Some, it is noted, prefer to speak of "proport i 1ate" and
e correct
"disproportionate" means. According to the statement,
judgment can be made in regard to the means by studying: the type
of treatment; 2) its degree of complexity and risk; 3) its c ~ t ; 4) the
possibilities of using the means; 5) comparing these with he results
which can be expected; 6) taking into account the stat .f the sick
person and his or her physical and moral resources. It r 1y thus be
judged that the treatments impose on the patient strain a 1 suffering
out of proportion to the benefits to be gained.
The particular difficulty which arises in our present C ( t ext is the
application of these criteria in the case of an infant. The at ter docu·
ment calls on us to take into account the "moral res ot~ ·es" of the
person. As Pius XII made clear this factor is crucial to t
question,
since the key question is whether the subject may or nay not be
diverted from the "spiritual ends" of human moral livJ ,g by a too
burdensome obligation. In the case of an infant, of co un ', we do not
have a person capable of moral choice, that is, we do not 1ave a moral
subject. The infant cannot itself make the kind of balanc ng judgment
between burden and benefit needed in resolving the question as to
whether the treatment is, or is not, proportionate to th e results to ~
expected. Therefore, in some way or other, others mu:-t make tha
judgment.
As I have argued earlier, there are some ways of m aking that judgi
0
ment which must be rejected. The discriminatory kind of " qualitY ,,
life" judgment is unacceptable. The second kind of " quality of hfe 1
judgment, which seeks to determine whether or not a certain kind~'
life is, or is not, a good for the infant, seems to be less than fu h~
satisfactory. There is another way, typically foll owed by those w
would uphold a "sanctity of life" ethic.
a1<
The starting point of this approach is to recognize that the we
264
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and defenseless are to be cherished and protected as our neighbors in
greatest need.21 We have, then, a positive duty to protect that infant
and that, inescapably, means protecting its life. But, like all positive
duties, this may be limited. These limits are set by the inherent limitations on the means of treatment available, considered in respect to the
limitations arising from the disabled condition of the infant. 22 When
there are insurmountable limits as to what we can do for thi s patient,
there are limits to what we ought to do.· Thus, the following criteria
seem to be acceptable. Treatments, in view of the disproportion
between the benefits they may confer and the burdens they will
impose, are themselves "extraordinary," or disproportionate to the
moral goal of care for the infant when:
!)treatment may be life-sustaining, but causes further d isabilities
(for example, some added impairment);
. 2) treatment may be life-sustaining, but is inseparably associated
with unduly burdensome conditions (for example, pain or
risk); 23 or when
3)treatment is not life-sustaining at all, but only prolongs dying.
However, there are other factors which must be considered. Some
. writers who would no doubt wish to uphold a " sanctity of life" r~ther
than a "quality of life" ethic, point out that "the· obligation to provide
means necessary to preserve life cannot be reduced to the distinction
?etween ordinary and extraordinary means. It is determined by the
m~e~ests of the patient, her/his relationship with the provider and the
ability of the latter to relie~e the patient's need without serious hardship."24 Furthermore, just as the principle of limitation or positive
dut~ can be applied to the duty of a person to sustain her /his own life,
50
It can be applied to the duties of others to sustain the life of
another. The positive duty to sustain the life of another does not bind
~all cost, in. the sense of requiring unlimited sacrifice on the part of
e one seekmg to sustain that life. How then are the limits on this
duty to be determined?
Father Ashley's Proposal

(l)~ther author, ~enedict Ashley, O.P., has proposed the following:
recei ~the expenditures proportionate to the benefit the patient will
'"h ve. (2) What would be the '.'reasonable interests" of the patient
" o wo ld h
.
,
reso
u
ardly Wish her /his family to be unduly burdened, ( 3) The
singl':ces of the family should be shared by all and not exhausted on a
Point ~ember.25 The first point is interesting in that it adds a further
benef~ t reference. to the basic question of the proportion of burden/
(the f~ ~ th~ patient .. Now it is asked whether the burden on others
Point ~f Y) Is proportiOnate to the benefit to the patient. The second
s I ts from the usual expression "best interests" of the patient,
August, 1985
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to "reasonable interests," which thus allows the burden
the family
to be taken into account in terms of what the pat i
would be
presumed to wish for that family. The third point invo '
:1 principle
of fairness, which governs the distribution of resourc
.vithin the
family. Thus, parents would not be unfair in limiting
resources
expended on one member of the family, where such ex ,d iture was
to the detriment of the others. All of these questio
would, no
doubt, be very difficult to answer in a practical situat ·. But they
seem reasonable in principle. They indicate, furtherm c
t hat there
are more questions to be asked than whether the availa
treatment
can correct or ameliorate the life-threatening condition i e may ask
about the limits on the duty to care which derive from : 1t he means '
of treatment (whether they are "ordinary" or "extn t dl· nary" or
"proportionate"); (2) the condition of the patient (wh(' 8r that con·
dition is irremediable or remediable only to a limited de· e ); (3)the
resources - physical, psychological, financial - of the
rson~ who
bear responsibility for the patient; (4) the resources of S• : iety, m ~~
sense that these are not infinite and hence, must be allo at ed acco
ing to some principle of distribution.
h
All these factors set limits. But the question still rem.-u ns as to t e
criteria of relevance and relative importance within whJ _;h thes~ fa~·
tors ought to be assessed. The perspective from which these cntena
ought be constructed is that of the person-patien· .26 Anoth:
1
approach would be exposed ~o th~ danger of imposing t~e exp~ut
tions and values of others - m th1s case adults - on the mfant. . t
having proprosed this, we still have to discern how that pa~~:~
centered perspective should be interpreted. Should w e construe
8
perspective according to an image of the patient-person as m~re1Yto
calculator of maximum benefit to self, or is it more appropnate r
proceed with an image of that patient-person as a m oral agent~;
better, as if that patient-person were a moral agent? If we select to
first option, we would encounter serious difficulties. How are weunt
know, for example, what calculation of burden/benefit would _co_ted
for such a patient as a net gain? It may well be that a very luni ed
form of life would be conceived as a benefit, at least wh en comP~an
with non-existence. On the other hand, if we were to c ons~ruc we
image of this patient-person as an agent capable of moral choices, n0
could construe in some way what such a moral agent would reas 01
ably want. For ex~mple, ~uch a moral agent wo.uld reason a~: s~cb
want to impose an unposs1ble burden on the family , nor wou
tht
an agent choose to take a course of action which would expo~g,
agent herself or himself to a condition of life which, after reacd fret'
stage of development where some degree of c onsciou sn~ss an .ble,
dom made a striving for moral and spiritual self-realiza~w~ P 0 ~i.Ill~
rendered the attaining of the higher spiritual good t oo difficultbe diSlarly, such a moral agent would not demand that resources

tributed in such a way as to favor that agent at the cost of unfair
deprivation of resources from other moral agents.
The obvious objection to such a construction is that the infants
who are being considered here are not moral agents.2 7 That being the
case, such a construction inevitably involves an imposition of our
values on those infants. The image of a moral agent which we form is
inevitably an image of ourselves. It has to be admitted, of course, that
any such attempt is a construction. Nevertheless, such a procedure
Would preclude some more objectional moves. Thus, for example, we
would be prevented from imposing on that patient an arbitrary judg~ent that shejhe was not a person like us, or was a person, but of less
~erent value than us. Similarly, we would be precluded from any
JUdgment that such a patient has lesser claims to care than we would
have. Furthermore, we would be precluded from speculations as to
whether such a patient had less potential than we have, and for that
reason had lesser claims to care.
But we could include a consideration of whether a life lived under
COnditions of severe pain and debility \\{>Uld make the pursuit of
llloral ends too difficult. Thus, we would have to ask ourselves
whether treating a life-threatening condition and so prolonging life,
when we cannot correct or ameliorate a condition which would produce severe suffering, would place that patient in a position requiring
llloral effort beyond reasonable limits. If we would not want to be
in such a situation calling for moral heroism, then we ought not
e another in such a position.

::ed

A Compelling Perspective
n:uch a perspective compels us to recognize a fundamental equality ,

inao only an equality of life, but an equality of persons. Precisely
far as we construct the judgments of the patient according to what
e
value,
we recognize that other as an equal. However , a further limit
111
. Ust be held clearly in view. There is a difference between construct~ such a judgment according to the values we hold, and constructing
n:\ldgJnent on the basis of our situation-dependent expectations.
it' Us, on the basis of what we have experienced of life and its possibil0~~ we m~t judge a very restricted form of life to fall far short of
IUchex~ta.tt?ns. But we are not justified in concluding from this that
lnd a dintln1shed form of life must be not meaningful for another,
ex~ not val~ble for another. For an infant who has not had our
lnd ence of life, a diminished form of life may indeed be valuable,
~~nly mo~e valuable than no life at all.
degr Y kind of Judgment about the life of another which attributes
OUr ees of value to that life on the basis of quality criteria drawn from
expectations of life is inherently defective. Such judgments are an
1t'
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imposition of our presuppositions on another. As such tr 'I fail precisely because they set aside the equal personhood of tha ther. On
the other hand, if we recognize the other as an equal pen 1, we may
reasonably anticipate that, when that other reaches a level f development where some, at least minimal, level of freedom and oral striv·
ing becomes possible, there are levels of suffering which , >Uld make
that striving too difficult. We are then not engaged in c .: : iding for
another whether or not herjhis life is more or less valuable. t ather, we
acknowledge in that other a common humanity with a con• wn call to
moral fulfillment . At the same time, we recognize com
n limita·
tions, such that where the call to moral fulfillment reache m individ·
ual in a condition of considerable pain and suffering, the · .!lowingof ,
that call may be simply beyond that individual's moral cap :ity. Thus,
the question to be asked is this: if we correct this indi ual's lifethreatening condition so that she jhe survives, but cannot .)rrect con·
ditions which will leave that individual in pain and sufferin , what will
be the human condition of that person when shejhe reacl ·s the stage
of free, moral agency? If It can be anticipated with a hig 1 degree of
probability that the condition will be such as to impo ~ ~ a burden
beyond reasonable bounds of human moral strength, t h 'n we maY
judge that our obligation to provide care has reached its lin its.
.
In the light of these considerations, we can consider a further linllt
to be added to those proposed above. Warren T . Reich has proposed
that a limit to the obligation to treat is set "when excesstvely burden·
some qualities are perpetuated by life-sustaining treat m ent." 29 fie
explains this in detail as follows :
As regards those infants who can be expected to experie nc e at least a
minimal self-consciousness and freedom of will and who the refore will be
striving to achieve moral (or moral-religious) self-realization , th e duty to
preserve life may be limited by the excessive hardship that w ou ld fore see·
ably be experienced by the patient if his entire striving to d isc o ve r moral
m ea ning in life were to be totally submerged in or utterly s trai ne d by the
m e re effort t o s urvive and by the suffering that accompanies th at effort.29

This would seem to me to be acceptable with certain pro visos, W~~
flow from what has been argued above. These would be : (1 ) proVId
that this is not construed as a judgment by an external ob~erver,_tb;;
such a life is less valuable in itself, or to ot hers, or to the mfant, ( f
0
provided that the judgment is not interpreted as an assessme~~ ,,
relative value based on the presence or absence of certain " qualttle5
such as " potential" or " capacity for human relationships"; (3} P~
vided that the judgment focuses on the equal personhood of the inr .
and thus construes the significance of the burden pr ecisely_a~ ren
ing the pursuit of moral (and religious) self-realizat ion too difficult ;
a person considered as sharing our common, lim it ed hum an ~tren ell'
Reich suggests that this could apply to infants afflicted wtth _rnt]lt
ingomyelocele.ao Thus, it might well apply to Baby Jane Doe, I{

very pessimistic prognosis were correct. But, as I have indicated there

are ~easons for doubting the reliability of .such prognoses, both in this

P&rt~cular case and in the generality of such cases. While such doubt
P€rsists, the presumption should be in favor of treatment. However, it
Would seem to be possible that there could be other kinds of cases
wh~e such a pessimistic prognosis could be made by reasonable medical JUdgment with a high degree of probability. In such a case the
range of complex ethical questions which have been discussed here
COuld I T
.
,
furth
eg~. I~ately be as~ed . Whi!~ subsequent discussion will no doubt
er clarify the precise meamng of the new law it must be asked
wheth er.,.tak en literally,
·
·
'
the requrrements
allow sufficient
scope for
such legitimate concerns.
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. We are so accustomed to thinking of knowledge, and the gathering of
It, as unqualifiedly good, that even faithful Christians and Jews are prone
to forget that their scriptures depict the quest _for knowledge as a
so~ce of tragic separation from God. For Christians, the human
cho1ce for the unqualified pursuit of knowledge is what required
God's repair of creation through the saving power of Christ.
. The reminder of our tragic relation to the quest to know everything
IS graphically portrayed in the second and third chapters of Genesis.
Here is the account of the creation of . man and woman and of a
wonderful garden. Of its lovely fruit they may freely eat, but not of
~ne tree- the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. To eat of that
peeet m~s deat~. But Adam and Eve, beguiled by the charming sern ~ ' did eat of 1t and the results are with us still. Our earthly life is
.: a perfect paradise without pain and sweat. Above all, they and we
~ separated from the tree of life and are mortal, not able on our own
wer to live eternally.
a gBu~ is knowledge really to be regarded as forbidden fruit? How can
a good ~u~h as knowledge be so regarded? Is knowledge, often seen as
lesso;vil~n Itself, ever to be seen as evil in itself, and the desire for it, no

fru~a~ has

prompted me to dare consider any knowledge, that sacred

What~ scholars' treasured labors, as, in any sense, to be forbidden?

spendi~ol would ~ttack a growth industry like researc~?.Governme~t

19 40 , t~ for m~1~al research alone soared from 18 million dollars m

three bil/40 milhon. dollars in 1950, and from there to more than
strong ion dollars m 1979. The lure of forbidden fruit is rather
less, onast~ven Eden'~ owner and manager soon discovered. N everthee assumptiOn that David really beat Goliath, I will fashion
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